



THE **NIETZSCHEAN** MIND
EDITED BY PAUL KATSAFANAS

ROUTLEDGE PHILOSOPHICAL MINDS

THE NIETZSCHEAN MIND

Friedrich Nietzsche (1844–1900) is widely acknowledged as one of the greatest thinkers of the nineteenth century. His work continues to have a significant influence on philosophy, cultural criticism and modern intellectual history.

The Nietzschean Mind seeks to provide a comprehensive survey of his work, not only placing it in its historical context but also exploring its contemporary significance. Comprising twenty-eight chapters by a team of international contributors, the volume is divided into seven parts:

- Major works
- Philosophical psychology and agency
- The self
- Value
- Culture, society and politics
- Metaphysics and epistemology
- The affirmation of life

This handbook includes coverage of all major aspects of Nietzsche's thought, including his discussions of value, culture, society, the self, agency, action, philosophical psychology, epistemology and metaphysics; explorations of the philosophical and scientific influences upon Nietzsche's thought; and discussion of Nietzsche's major works.

Essential reading for students and researchers in philosophy, Nietzsche's work is central to ethics, moral psychology and political philosophy.

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NIETZSCHE'S CRITICAL LEGACY AND *BEYOND* *GOOD AND EVIL*

Christa Davis Acampora

[A] certain form of critical spirit has sent us down the wrong path, encouraging us to fight the wrong enemies and, worst of all, to be considered as friends by the wrong sort of allies because of a little mistake in the definition of its main target. The question was never to get *away* from facts but *closer* to them, not fighting empiricism but, on the contrary, renewing empiricism.

(Latour 2004: 231)

A new species of philosophers is coming up: I venture to baptize them with a name that is not free of danger. [. . .] these philosophers of the future may have a right – it might also be a wrong – to be called *attempters*. This name itself is in the end a mere attempt and, if you will, a temptation.

(BGE: 41)¹

What is our critical inheritance from Nietzsche? A quick initial response comes to mind: surely it lies in his scathing critiques of some of philosophy's most cherished concepts and ideas, its methods and approaches and its canonical figures. A heady dose of Nietzsche engenders a good deal of scepticism, *suspicion*.² Nietzsche highlights hidden assumptions, questions the basis for the normativity of truth. He challenges ultimate motivations and hidden agendas, and wonders about limitations of perspectives both personal and at the general level of the human. And throughout his writings, he tests the utility and efficacy of the tools of inquiry, including various forms of reasoning and observation.

But if this is the greatest reward for learning from Nietzsche, it is unclear how we are to sort out the sorry mess in which we seem to find ourselves, how we might rise up from the ruins that so much critique might lay bare. Worse still, surely Nietzsche's own critiques would wither under the weight of similarly focused scrutiny, his pointed barbs explained as perhaps the projection of his sexual frustration, as Wagner first speculated, or his precarious financial position, or a reaction against Lutheranism, the family tradition. This Nietzsche who tears everything apart as evidence of so much power play is the evil twin of Nietzsche-the-genealogist who supposedly gives us a new form of history, the practice of which at times appears to

destroy things by turning them into their opposite rather than tearing them apart. It may appear that in the arsenal of modern critical tools, we are supposed to find a genealogical method that exposes the joints of the constructivism that accounts for the creation of all treasures thought to be naturally inherited. Mindful of the genealogy of this or that concept, this or that institution, we supposedly uncover the 'birth' of the ideas and forms of organization that shape social life and intellectual and cultural development. Genealogy reveals and exposes so much invention: It presumably shows how caprice and artifice produce distinctions and significances that are mistaken as discoveries of something real. The use of this critical tool would seem to disclose the *processes that produce facts* rather than any *facts themselves*.

There is, perhaps, a great deal of cleverness in these interpretations and a certain measure of self-satisfaction for those who practice them. The critic-genealogist who claims *these* prerogatives from Nietzsche might achieve a sense of righteousness as one of the few *in the know*, the non-duped, or an insider, someone who regards themselves as taking an invitation from Nietzsche to 'play the wicked game' (BGE 205). But, even if this can be rendered coherent – and it is not at all clear it can be, for what are we to make of the story that unmasks other pretences to the real and the true as nothing but (just-so?) stories? – it is entirely unclear what else is gained by use of such tools. Critique of the slave revolt in morality, for example, and other cases of alleged *ressentiment* can appear to be little more than instances of the genetic fallacy if such evidence is supposed to thoroughly undermine whatever idea, movement or institution it is alleged to have initiated. And supposing we were to recognize in philosophy, logic and science (some of Nietzsche's favoured targets) more *invention* than *discovery* – what follows from that? Are we to regard the artifacts of our inquiries as little more (or, indeed, quite less) than literature, and how could we ever lay claim to offer something that is superior to sheer fancy? If this is Nietzsche's critical legacy then it appears to be, at best, largely ineffectual for any positive development and, at worst, downright harmful insofar as it would undermine one's capacity to make any sort of compelling argument at all or lay claim to what is more reasonable than not. In such a case, the charge seems justified that this kind of critique is more akin to a virus than a *cause célèbre*, much less something whose products should be published and shared with others.³

We might also imagine that tools such as these are similar to those about which Plato's Socrates worries in the *Republic* when he prohibits students in the *Kallipolis* from learning dialectic before mastering other subjects, and in any event not prior to the age of thirty. Nietzsche himself expresses related concerns, particularly about motivations for destructive critical projects and their likely backlash, when he observes in *Beyond Good and Evil* that youth encourages us to 'venerate and despise without that art of nuances which constitutes the best gain of life', motivated by what he calls a 'taste for the unconditional'. Saying 'no' to everything, as the critical project that finds suspicious motivations might suggest, is not what Nietzsche intends. He also considers what follows in the wake of disappointment once one realizes that this stance has failed to net any positive gains. Nietzsche continues,

Later, when the young soul, tortured by all kinds of disappointments, finally turns suspiciously against itself, still hot and wild, even in its suspicion and pangs of conscience – how wroth it is with itself now! How it tears itself to pieces, impatiently! [. . .] one experiences even a good conscience as a danger, as if it were a way of wrapping oneself in veils and the exhaustion of subtler honesty – and above all one takes sides, takes sides on principle, *against* 'youth' – Ten years later one comprehends that all this, too – was still youth.

(BGE 31)

It is no wonder that predispositions of this sort – setting aside the question of their legitimacy – have been subjected to critical scrutiny. If this is where the critical tradition leads from Nietzsche, then it is quite likely not only ‘out of steam’, as Latour puts it, but also passed over with good riddance. A backlash against critique in favour of a revival of fundamental (and fundamentalist) ontology or rigid empiricism is understandable, but it, too, is still possessed by similarly youthful enthusiasm.

In Nietzsche studies, one way of bucking the critical trends sometimes associated with (or pejoratively summed up as) ‘postmodernism’ has taken the form of emphasizing Nietzsche’s ‘naturalism’, usually turning Nietzsche into an empiricist of sorts.⁴ Scholars remind us of Nietzsche’s interest in science and his hostility towards idealism (especially his opposition to Plato, Kant and Hegel), and, more curiously, of his commitment to truth. If pressed by these larger philosophical motivations Nietzsche’s critical projects can be either minimized or described as in the service of some grander systematic programme. But this portrait of Nietzsche, much like the general sketch of the legacy of critique at the start of this chapter, can lead to a false dilemma that is anchored by the extremes of vapid irrationalism or flat-footed empiricism. Nietzsche was explicitly critical of these, too. Recognition that this is a false dilemma may be precisely part of what endures as valuable in the critical legacy Nietzsche provides.

Latour recently proposed that we should turn our backs on critique in favour of ‘renewing empiricism’ and ‘cultivat[ing]. . . a *stubbornly realist attitude*’ (2004: 231). But this, too, is problematic insofar as there is surely much that critique can show us about how the ways in which we conceive of ‘the real’ reveal not only other interests such projects might serve but also the kinds of objects that are discoverable by such kinds of inquiry. So, critique in this sense can potentially illuminate something about the limits of a form of inquiry or the domains to which it is applied. The critical work can provide a stimulus for a productive response. In the sections that follow, I shall provide an example to show how Nietzsche demonstrates precisely that in his *Beyond Good and Evil*, particularly in his critique of what he calls *soul atomism* and his positive response as he pursues some reformulations of ‘the soul hypothesis’.

I. Limits of problems and limits of evidence

Nietzsche’s admiration for and practice of varieties of scepticism stand in contrast with his apparent praise of ‘sensualism’, which has been the subject of significant discussion in the Nietzsche literature,⁵ particularly as it bears on his naturalism and assessment of the aims, methods and results of science (BGE 15).⁶ A sizeable body of secondary literature relies upon certain assumptions about Nietzsche’s apparent endorsement of sensualism – and ultimately, it’s supposed, empiricism – when he writes, ‘Sensualism, therefore, at least as a regulative hypothesis, if not as a heuristic principle. [Sensualismus mindestens somit als regulative Hypothese, um nicht zu sagen als heuristisches Princip.]’ Caution is warranted here, because ambivalent views about ‘sensualism’ can be found in the very same text and, indeed, in the very same section in which the statement appears.

In the prior section, Nietzsche contrasts the thought of Plato, who ‘mastered the senses’ (BGE 14) by dulling and containing empirical evidence, with those who are captivated by sensory information (and its evidence as data) and believe that such warrants *explanation* rather than *interpretation*. At this point, Nietzsche offers one of his apparently positive references to Plato, when he calls Plato’s philosophizing *noble* in this respect, and he contrasts this with the later development of what he calls ‘popular sensualism’ (PS).

Popular sensualism is further contrasted with a different sort of imperative stance associated with the idea of ‘sensualism [. . .] as a regulative hypothesis’ (SRH). In setting these views side by side, a significant difference becomes evident:

- 1 ‘was sich sehen und tasten läßt – bis so weit muss man jedes Problem treiben’ (only what can be seen and felt – every problem has to be pursued to that point; BGE 15 [PS]), and
- 2 ‘wo der Mensch nichts mehr zu sehen und zu greifen hat, da hat er auch nichts mehr zu suchen’ (where one cannot find anything to see and to grasp he has no further business; BGE 15 [SRH]).

The first (PS) concerns the extent to which a problem is pursued, *the limits of evidence*, according to those holding the view of popular sensualism; the second (SRH) is about the *limits of problems* when guided by sensualism as a regulative hypothesis.

This distinction between the *limits of evidence* and the *limits of problems* is particularly important for engaging with Nietzsche’s philosophy, because *posing problems*⁷ – raising new ones and refiguring old ones – is central to his philosophical practice, and it is an important dimension of his critical legacy. It is also relevant to understanding *how* Nietzsche embraces naturalism and, equally important, some limits on what it is we might reasonably and responsibly infer from this. Nietzsche clearly does not reject the value of sense experience, but neither does he limit knowledge to whatever can be the subject of empirical investigation given our *problems* as we currently understand them. He neither patently *endorses* scientific explanation nor *limits* philosophy to whatever the sciences cannot currently explain. We do not have to separate kinds of questions and domains of inquiry in order to realize Nietzsche’s position. It is not the case that he thinks the reduction of one to the other is avoided simply by limiting scientific inquiry to one realm and everything else to another.⁸

Instead, Nietzsche anticipates that philosophical activity might realize a certain relation between invention and discovery. In this respect, philosophy has the potential to invent new critical tools for investigation and frameworks for analysis. These, he imagines, are their distinctive contributions to inquiry. This activity is inventive (if not artful or artistic) insofar as it helps to shape what it is that *can be seen*, what can become objects of investigation. It thereby facilitates disclosure of what might be discovered. In this respect, then, to return to the earlier distinction between the limits of problems and the limits of evidence, philosophical inquiry can engage in *erfinden* – inventing ways of approaching and refiguring *problems* – to open new possibilities for *finden*, that is, generating evidence to found discovery.

One way of deepening our understanding of this relation is to consider discussions in contemporary philosophies of science and mind that explore reasoning practices in the sciences and processes of cognitive recruitment. To be clear, I do not think that Nietzsche was engaged in philosophy of science or philosophy of mind as we now understand these fields; rather, he made use of some forms of reasoning that current research distinguishes as important to the development of scientific exploration and reasoning. Recognizing this in Nietzsche’s work can advance our understanding of his philosophical practice, and it may resolve (or dissolve) some tensions in the scholarship. In particular, we can explore Nietzsche’s practice of mental modelling and his use of this tool as a technology for drawing on as well as producing empirical evidence. In the remainder of this chapter, I will review some of the literature on mental modelling, discuss an example of how Nietzsche engages it, and explain the import of this for his conception of philosophy.⁹ In my conclusion, I review some import of these ideas for how we regard Nietzsche’s efforts to realize a naturalized philosophy.

II. Mental modelling

In other contexts, I have sought to link Nietzsche's naturalism to a practice that includes drawing on forms of reasoning that are familiar in philosophy, including those consistent with empirical research, along with other kinds of inquiry and mental resources that are more frequently associated with creative activity, including imaginative and productive forms of representation. This, I have argued, is part of Nietzsche's positive philosophy and the complement to his critical efforts.¹⁰ But, precisely what this creative dimension is could still use elaboration. This is not to say that there is a dearth of scholarship that takes up Nietzsche's interest in art, the aesthetic and even his own efforts to engage in artful enterprises, such as the literary qualities of his writing more generally and in *Thus Spoke Zarathustra* specifically. My concern here is not to link philosophical practice with literature, poetry or other more familiar artistic activities. Instead, I consider Nietzsche's method in the context of research focused on more mundane creative reasoning in the form of mental modelling.

A mental model is 'a structural, behavioral, or functional analog to a real-world phenomenon' that 'preserves constraints inherent in what is represented' (Nersessian 2007: 129). It may, or may not, admit of a physical representation, such as the Bohr atom, which depicts atomic structures as like micro versions of solar systems. It engages and utilizes productive capacities of human thought including imaginative resources. These organizational models are 'units containing representations of spatio-temporal structure, causal connections, and other relational structures' (ibid.: 130). One might be motivated to engage in mental modelling because it draws on and facilitates development of 'different kinds of representation [. . . so as to] enable different kinds of processing operations' (ibid.: 131). Models have a form of representation that differs from linguistic and formulaic constructions. They represent *demonstratively* rather than *propositionally* (Alexander 2016).¹¹ Operations on them involve 'transformations of the representations' (Nersessian 2007: 132). Therefore, they are assessed in terms of *fit* rather than logical entailment. Thus, mental modelling can play a role in the exposition of inquiry and its results. But it may also be used as a tool for *discovery*.

Mental modelling is integral to inquiry. Models can enlarge perspectives and facilitate applications of other forms of knowledge in imaginative engagement and transformation. There is a well-established literature on modelling with the use of physical knowledge, particularly spatial knowledge. In this respect, successful mental modelling 'provides access to novel data'. It is 'a species of reasoning rooted in the abilit[ies] to imagine, anticipate, visualize, and re-experience from memory' (Nersessian 2007: 127). Instead of seeing this as a specialized technique or practice, researchers in the field regard mental modelling as a refinement of 'mundane abilities' for 'usage in the reasoning practices' of communities of inquiry.¹² Mental modelling facilitates not only conveying and communicating hypotheses and conclusions but also *generating* inferences through manipulations of the model.

Modelling may have significant, distinctive potency and efficiency in inferential load. The use of models invites one to 'make inferences through simulating the events and processes depicted by the model' (Nersessian 2007: 147). Using models can be 'discernibly faster' than other reasoning methods. In using a mental model, 'the reasoner [may be able] to generate inferences without having to carry out the extensive operations needed to process the same amount of background information to make inferences from an argument in propositional form' (Nersessian 2007: 146).¹³ Moreover, insofar as modelling recruits and draws on real-world experiences as correctly understood, it can be a highly robust tool of inquiry because models may access and simultaneously engage a variety of cognitive resources such as anticipation, imagination, visualization, experiencing and re-experiencing.¹⁴ Additionally, mental models

may play a significant role in *priming* inquiry. They may serve functions of targeting, framing, positioning, enabling, reshaping cognitive frames and bringing the most salient features of the subject to view.¹⁵

Importantly, models elicit related or extended conceptual fields or arrays. Thus, mental modelling involves organizing conceptual systems and arrays representing the domains about which one wants to reason. This entails ‘abstraction – idealized and schematic in nature’ of the ‘target phenomena’ (Nersessian 2007: 148). Modelling can create novel problem-solving contexts because it can reposition an object of inquiry to create new problems to solve. In this way, modelling can ‘challenge . . . deeply accepted . . . principles and lead to the development of radically new representational structures’ (ibid.: 153). These can shape and redefine the ‘scope of conclusions’ to be drawn (ibid.: 146).

While models can play important roles in indicating problems, establishing limits of exploration, scouting borders or boundaries of various kinds of conceptual schemes and schemas, they are not self-sufficient or final. Models provide *access points* for inquiry, and they galvanize inferential activities. As indicated above, both creating and manipulating models may recruit various kinds of cognitive resources. This includes knowledge derived from other empirical sources. In this respect, then, models map to and leverage other more familiar real-world experiences. Models draw on real-world knowledge and make use of what is described as *emblematic representation*: ‘representation of spatial, temporal, and causal relationships among events and entities of the [modell]’ (Nersessian 2007: 145).¹⁶ Insofar as empirical research requires that knowledge be derived from experience and that claims have sufficient warrant, the creative activity of modelling might well advance and facilitate empirical research rather than constitute a departure from it.

As I will elaborate below, Nietzsche shares the view advanced in contemporary philosophy of mind that ‘the human conceptual system is interpretative and inferential’ and that even empirically grounded perceptual representations are not merely ‘recording systems’ (Nersessian 2007: 142, 141).¹⁷ This is what drew him to then contemporary work on sensory and perceptual systems, as, for example, the work on auditory perception by Helmholtz. Nietzsche’s mental modelling plays both a critical and productive role in his thought. He explicitly draws on transformations of conceptual representations that have been interrogated (and often undermined) in critical work. He makes interventions and innovations in the interpretative and inferential bases of significant, philosophically primary conceptual systems. Thus, I think it is helpful to see Nietzsche’s critical work as challenging the bases for conceptualization, as examining and at times reorienting interpretative vectors that guide the accumulation of data and evidence in human experience. A good place to see this at work is in his modelling of the soul.

III. Nietzsche’s model of the soul

Mental modelling is a form of inquiry to which Nietzsche repeatedly turns in considering how to model the human subject in ways that are responsive to and responsible for its ‘uncanny dual nature’ (‘Homer’s Contest’), which is to say, *shaped by both nature and culture*. I think it is a practice he frequently employs and anticipates, but my goal here is a modest one: I simply aim to show that mental modelling is part of his philosophical practice, and not to defend the claim that it is routine, which would require a more expansive survey and consideration of cases. A secondary goal is to show that this form of inquiry is consistent with naturalism, and that this unites rather than divides Nietzsche’s interests. This becomes clear in *Beyond Good and Evil* in the sections that precede and follow those that were highlighted above concerning the *limits of problems* and the *limits of evidence*. Nietzsche aims to figure the *problem* of the soul

in terms that are familiar based on other experiences and in so doing, he makes other aspects of the 'soul' apparent and available so as to provide *evidence* to be used in further inquiry.

As mentioned above, a mental model is an analogue that shares structural, functional or behavioural similarities to something that is already part of our experience. Drawing connections among the related parts or functions in order to grasp the analogical relation recruits cognitive resources that may facilitate deepening our understanding of the target phenomenon. It may, as discussed above, also facilitate an extension of our understanding, allowing us to realize something new about the target itself. Even more, it can enable building on or extending that knowledge by making inferences that follow from the new knowledge gained about the target. This is because inquiry can be both furthered and shaped by the application of conceptual arrays or families.¹⁸ This is to say, some concepts more readily go along with others, so that an initial conceptual formulation orients inquiry in a certain way. How we begin to define or conceptualize an object of inquiry brings its own related concepts. For example, if we suppose that knowledge is something like a commodity then we might be inclined to think that learning is about *receiving* or *acquiring* something of this sort from another, because commodities are *things* that are acquired, held and exchanged. Thus, if we wanted to engage in an inquiry into teaching and learning along these lines, then we might organize our research to consider actors in markets, means of exchange, measurements for the goods, etc. Another way of thinking of at least one kind of mental modelling is that it allows for experimentation with primary or core concepts, a concept that anchors others or one that opens up new arrays.

Nietzsche's focus is on these kinds of relationships when he considers how *atomism* continues to linger in philosophy and influence the conceptual fields that go along with it. In *Beyond Good and Evil* 12, at the centre or heart of the part titled 'On the Prejudices of Philosophers', Nietzsche observes that 'materialistic atomism' has all but disappeared from all serious kinds of inquiry and yet its vestiges live on – it has a 'dangerous afterlife' – in the form of what he calls an *atomic need* ('atomistischen Bedürfnisse'), a need to reduce everything to its indivisible, essential components. Nietzsche calls for an attack on this idea, to engage a 'relentless war unto death', and particularly against what he calls *soul atomism*, 'which regards the soul as something indestructible, eternal, indivisible, as a monad, as an *atomon*'. Nietzsche's suggestions for how to accomplish this attack are especially interesting, and they reveal much about how he envisions the work of this mission.

In undermining this idea, in the commission of the 'war unto death' against it, Nietzsche does not recommend destroying but rather *reforming* it: 'the way is open for new versions and refinements of the soul-hypothesis [Seelen-Hypothese]'. He specifically warns against the unwieldiness of the naturalists who lose the soul the minute they try to get a grip on it. Rather than jettisoning the soul concept ('Seelen-Vorstellung'), we might refine it, he imagines, and then he offers a series of possible alternatives: 'mortal soul'; 'soul as subjective multiplicity'; 'soul as social structure of the drives and affects' ['sterbliche Seele' und 'Seele als Subjekts-Vielheit' und 'Seele als Gesellschaftsbau der Triebe und Affekte']. Following this, Nietzsche goes on to pursue these very alternatives, to advance a model that might replace *soul atomism*.

Before considering the details at some length, we might wonder why Nietzsche retains the conception of soul at all: Why not jettison it entirely? Why does he regard it as 'one of the most ancient and venerable hypotheses' (BGE 12)? By the time we reach the end of the section, we have a clue. 'Soul' is a conceptual unit that orients and governs our understanding of human nature and its capacities. Soul modelling is the work of (philosophical) 'psychologists' and the 'new psychologist [neue Psycholog]' Nietzsche envisions will have this task. How he thinks about this work is interesting. Because the new psychologist will not have truck with the old and current versions of the soul-hypothesis, he will find himself alone and an exile – he will

seem strange, suspicious. He will have to make his concept anew. In so doing, he will engage in invention (*erfinden*), he will create a new model; yet this might not simply remain a creative product. It just might facilitate discovery (*finden*).

As a replacement for the model of the soul as atomic, self-contained and substantial, Nietzsche offers one as mortal, a social structure. This alternative model lends itself to thinking of the soul as something relational, non-substantial, dynamic; admitting of hierarchy, cooperation and adversarial engagement. Nietzsche's alternative model is rooted in a natural as opposed to a supernatural conception of human beings: that we are mortal, that there are multiple phenomena for which we need to account, and that these various dimensions have relational qualities and mutually impact each other. So, 'soul' – a concept with a supernatural history – is nominally (but not trivially) retained at the same time that it is placed in a natural framework and with features that are analogous to other kinds of entities that might be much more familiar in our experience (e.g. like a collective, or as a social structure). Nonetheless, it is sure that 'soul' itself does not atomically and independently exist, at least according to Nietzsche's account, and it would seem that the new 'versions and refinements' might be regarded as *inventive* and therefore not *discoveries* lying in wait once we are no longer blinded by the fog of atomism. Nietzsche goes on to explore some details of one such hypothesis when in BGE 19, he claims that 'our body is but a social structure composed of many souls [. . .] in all willing it is absolutely a question of commanding and obeying, on the basis, as already said, of a social structure composed of many "souls."'

This important section of *Beyond Good and Evil* sheds light on Nietzsche's conception of human subjectivity and its implications for a different conception of agency, and it neatly illustrates the distinctive way in which he might be thought to be a naturalist while nevertheless crucially relying on forms of critique with which naturalism has been contrasted, particularly among Nietzsche scholars. In this case, Nietzsche's critical challenge to *soul atomism* clears the way for and facilitates the development of a productive complement in the conceptual reformation. To see how this is so, we might consider the application of these ideas in *Beyond Good and Evil* 19,¹⁹ which begins with Nietzsche's observation that philosophers have a tendency to assume that 'will' is self-evident, 'the best-known thing in the world', or, in Schopenhauer's case, the *only* thing knowable. In this respect, Nietzsche claims, Schopenhauer committed the same error that plagues all philosophers: 'he adopted a *popular prejudice* and exaggerated it'. Instead of taking will as the best known thing in the world, Nietzsche tells us that he finds it 'complicated'.

Nietzsche suggests we might model willing on something like a complex. What we describe with the single word 'willing' emerges as relations among sensations, thoughts and affects, because these are the things that serve as signs of willing itself. If we consider the phenomenon of willing – say, the willing of raising one's arm – then our first associations are with *sensations* of various physical states, which seem to occur in the context of some tacit proprioceptive awareness such as 'away from' my lap and 'toward' the cup on the table. Further, there is what Nietzsche distinguishes as a 'ruling thought'. He does not do much to elaborate what this is, and he seems to suggest it could be the goal of whatever is willed when he writes, 'let us not imagine it possible to sever this thought from the 'willing,' as if any will would then remain over!' We might consider this to be identical with what is typically discussed in the literature as intention or the *content* of intent, the specific aim around which the rest revolves. However there are reasons to think that 'ruling thoughts', as Nietzsche describes them, might be better understood as general dispositions, overarching orientations towards activity more generally, rather than as specific intentional states.²⁰ Ruling thoughts conceived along these lines include

more general notions such as '*amor fati*' or 'everything pertaining to the body is despicable'. What we think of as specific intentions emerge and coalesce in relation to these notions once they come to dominate the organizations that we are, once they come to *rule*.

Another possibility for what 'ruling thoughts' might be – and these senses are not mutually exclusive, both could be apt – is that they are thoughts *about* ruling, about how to rule, or how to exercise and execute one's will. For example, being conflicted, feeling oneself pulled by differing or even opposing aims is a common experience. I may have the notion that it would be good for me to finish this chapter. I *want* to finish this chapter. I really *should* finish this chapter given that I have promised it to the editor, etc. And at the same time, I might find that I am presented with other more appealing opportunities about which I can muster greater enthusiasm, and I find myself short on time for the work of finishing the chapter. (And, in the course of living a full life, very many other feelings, sensations and thoughts compete.) I could decide that there are various different ways of trying to sort out this competition for my time and attention, to establish some order and, finally – *do something!* I might decide that the best way to rule in this tug of war is simply starve the competing alternatives, try to squelch them until the chapter is written. Or, I might decide that a better way to make progress is to feed the competitors just enough to temporarily satisfy them so that I might make the most productive use of my time and relax enough to do the thinking the project requires, to mentally and physically clear the way. Such decisions about settling one's own affairs in this way might be considered a thought about ruling oneself.

Whether Nietzsche envisions 'ruling thoughts' (in BGE 19) as have ruling as their *content* rather than their *characteristic*, he nevertheless also thinks that the organization that occurs in the context of what we designate with the single word *will* comes together as a *complex* with an abiding order, or *order of rule*.²¹ What allows that complex to be a distinctive organization is relative to its ability to order and organize its multiple constituents, and there are, of course, many ways in which this might occur, just as there are many varieties of political orders and forms of ruling. Conceived in this way, ruling thoughts would be those that rule or bid the action, the predominant or overarching thoughts whose content gives shape to specific intentions. Or, they could govern the ordering of the structure of drives that constitutes a being. Regardless of the precise nature of 'ruling thoughts', Nietzsche claims, from the phenomenological standpoint, the most important ingredient of the complex activity that we call *willing* is affect, specifically that experienced as the affect of command.

Every willing being is a composite of commanding and commanded parts. What we call 'willing' is not solely the command of an atomic entity; it is the expression of what (part[s]) commands other parts within the complex organization one is. Nietzsche writes: 'A man who *wills* commands something within himself that renders obedience, or that he believes renders obedience' (BGE 19). It is not simply that we do this or experience this as springing from our 'true' selves, because, inasmuch as we are commanders, we are also what is *commanded*; in willing, *being commanded* is just as much 'our own', part of our 'true selves', as commanding is. Nietzsche attempts to unravel the knot of sensations that emerges from this plurality: 'as the obeying party we know the sensations of constraint, impulsion, pressure, resistance, and motion, which usually begin immediately after the act of will'. So, the phenomenon of willing is not only linked with our experience of our efficacy in effecting change in the world, of ourselves as agents or actors who can be seen as the cause of such-and-such event; the phenomenon of effecting change is experienced within and among the various parts of ourselves.

But Nietzsche thinks we ordinarily 'disregard this duality, and [. . .] deceive ourselves about it by means of the synthetic concept "I" [. . .]'. In other words, although willing is experienced

as a dynamic of commanding and obeying (with separable and distinct features), we treat it as a singular activity and disregard (or distance ourselves from) at least half of the process. When we do this, we are mistaken in at least two respects, insofar as we (1) overlook much of what occurs (namely, that in commanding there is also obeying), and (2) associate ourselves with only one facet of the complex (i.e. commanding). Nietzsche claims that from this, ‘a whole series of erroneous conclusions, and consequently of false evaluations of the will itself, has become attached to the act of willing – to such a degree that he who wills believes sincerely that willing *suffices* for action’ (BGE 19).

Thus, regardless of what Nietzsche intended earlier in the same section when he mentioned ‘ruling thoughts’ as a component of the complex we call ‘willing’, there is a ruling structure at work here, both in terms of the emergence of an *organization* – a hierarchy or other configuration of ruling and ruled elements – and some particular *way* in which those parts relate and come to have the order they do, the way in which *ruling* occurs. Nietzsche seems to think that what we designate with the term ‘will’ is more closely related to feelings generated by or derived from this interaction rather than the process itself; our *sense* of ‘will’ appears to be epiphenomenal – which is not to say there is *no* willing – and these feelings are rather confused, as just outlined above.

To compound this confusion, Nietzsche thinks we have a secondary feeling of ‘an increase of the sensation of power which accompanies all success’ when we believe we have successfully carried out ‘willing’, as though we achieved some special status as its executor: “Freedom of the will” – that is the expression for the complex state of delight of the person exercising volition, who commands and at the same time identifies himself with the executor of the order – who, as such, enjoys also the triumph over obstacles, but thinks within himself that it was really his will itself that overcame them’ (BGE 19). Even when we experience what is commanded as somehow part of ourselves, we still associate *willing* with the overcoming of obstacles and *our true selves* as entitled to a sense of achievement of having done it. Nietzsche continues, ‘In this way the person exercising volition adds the feelings of delight of his successful executive instruments, the useful “underwills” or under-souls – indeed, our body is but a social structure composed of many souls – to his feelings of delight as a commander’ (BGE 19).

But the fact that the sensations we associate with willing are epiphenomenal does not at all mean, as Nietzsche’s discussion here makes clear, that we should abolish the notion of soul. The modelling of *soul* as a complex, as a political structure, facilitates exploration along the lines elaborated above. Nietzsche’s original point is that we need a new conception of soul, a new model that we can use to grasp its dimensions and facets and to set these in motion to understand how those different components interact.²² We can now turn our attention to how such a view stands in relation to Nietzsche’s naturalism and in particular to a commitment to empiricism, which is believed to be part of it.

IV. Naturalism reconsidered

The scholarly literature now includes many discussions of Nietzsche’s naturalism, including what it means to be a naturalist, the kinds of commitments that go along with such a view, and how Nietzsche’s normative and aesthetic interests may or may not be accommodated within such a framework. Just what constitutes a commitment to naturalism remains an open question both in Nietzsche studies and the broader philosophical community. Virtually all varieties grant priority to (and sometimes demand consistency with) a scientifically comprehended nature. Some varieties coalesce around the notion that traditional areas of concern in philosophy

– such as knowledge, mind and morality – should be comprehended *within* the view of nature that is the product of our *best science*, either consistent with it or at least compatible with that view of nature. Still others think that naturalizing philosophy entails *doing* philosophy in a way that differs from the speculative traditions, adopting the methods of science, its standards of evidence.²³

There are further questions about which sciences and scientific practices should (or could) be central to a naturalistic view. There are considerable differences between a naturalism that takes *physics* as its paradigmatic science and a naturalism that looks to *biology* as a guide. The one, physics, seeks laws, causes and explanations. Whereas biology emphasizes modelling and ‘separation of causes and mechanisms from general laws’ (Rouse 2007: 71). Furthermore, consider the difference between a science (or form of inquiry) motivated by *explanation* from one concerned with *discovery* and *exploration*. These differing overarching aims and expectations mark shifts in attentional orientation: they attend to different things, anticipate different outcomes. This affects both the objects of investigation and the form the inquiries take. It also has a different sense of experimentation.

The elaborate example of Nietzsche's revision of the soul hypothesis hopefully makes clearer how Nietzsche's speculation that the notion of ‘soul’ might still have utility (provided it can be reformulated) is *consistent* with his naturalism. Nietzsche's experimental mental modelling of alternatives to soul atomism is not merely consistent with his naturalism but also epitomizes the way in which he intends to carry out his project ‘to translate man back into nature’ (BGE 230), since he envisions a reciprocal relation between the inventive activities of philosophy, such as modelling, and its critical engagement of science, in which legacy models and core concepts are identified, examined and sometimes shown to be ineffective or even disabling. Science can be purged of the superstitious and supernatural ideas that continue to lurk in its basic concepts as the atomistic need, in the old sense, may be expressed there too, even as the notion of the atom and its structure undergoes transformation. This ‘newly redeemed nature’ can be used to further ‘“naturalize” humanity’ (GS 109), not in a ‘clumsy’ manner (BGE 12) or through misplaced faith in causal explanations as ‘whoever [like natural scientists . . .] “naturalizes” in his thinking’ (BGE 21).

Nietzsche's suggestions of ‘“soul as subjective multiplicity” and “soul as social structure of the drives and affects”’ (BGE 12), discussed above, make it possible to pick out different features of human psychology that are obscured by the atomic model of the soul hypothesis. The conception of soul as social structure can hardly count as a *discovery* – Nietzsche is clearly not asserting that there are multiple persons or drives with personalities comprising the soul. Thus, the conceptual formulation of ‘soul as social structure’ is surely a model and in that respect artificial. As such, it might be appropriate to consider it an *invention*, a kind of heuristic device that functions to facilitate discoveries of additional features that would otherwise go unnoticed because they would fail to show up as objects of investigation and observation. In this case, that feature Nietzsche seems to have in mind here is the relational nature of the complex organization he is examining. This potential *discovery* is obtained, if this is indeed a significant feature of human psychology, by taking up the model and working with it. The model allows its user to draw on experiences of social life, on knowledge of how social relations work – their dynamic qualities and the power relations that can obtain within them – to generate new data for further investigation. Primed to pick out the features that the model suggests and to anticipate the relations that an application of the model brings to light, one is in a position to engage in further, new research, testing these new ideas to discover whether they yield new phenomena.

A further important point for Nietzsche seems to be that the domain of invention of this kind is not simply *everything else* that is left over *after* science offers its explanations. Nietzsche thinks scientific and empirical activities are facilitated and guided by those which are inventively produced. Engaging in this type of conceptual and theoretical innovation appears to be how Nietzsche thinks about philosophy and a significant fruit of critique.²⁴ Nietzsche's naturalism is neither a bald endorsement of empiricism nor an expression of the view that empirical research presents the 'facts' about reality, particularly human reality. Nietzsche sought to reformulate significant concepts that he regarded as created from a defective (or exhausted) set of values, and he thought such reformulation would be relevant to a kind of naturalism that would *bring philosophy and science closer together*, not reductively (e.g. philosophy reduced to science, or science reduced to philosophical science studies) but rather productively, in which case both areas of inquiry benefit from the application of the perspectives and investigative tools that are distinctly theirs.

Nietzsche draws a curious connection between invention and discovery in *Beyond Good and Evil* 12, where he suggests *erfinden* (invention) might eventually lead to *finden* (discovery). In this case, it is important to not think of *erfinden* as sheer (trivial or capricious) invention. The products of invention would not be pure fiction; rather, as in the case of mental models, they may serve as access points, touchstones for framing inquiry. That Nietzsche anticipates such revised concepts will be inventions rather than discoveries is consistent with what he says about truth and the limits of human knowledge, particularly as it is sought in philosophy.

This contrast between *invention* and *discovery* is complemented by Nietzsche's distinction between *interpretation* and *explanation*. Even the formalized sciences provide us with what are interpretations, not explanations of the phenomena investigated – as much as philology, which was trying to formalize its methods so as to make itself a science, provides interpretations of its objects of investigation, so too does physics. We can recognize this without necessarily lapsing into a pernicious relativism that would have it that all interpretations have equal weight or value. Further, we can recognize that such descriptions are always organized to suit our purposes or interests without having to conclude that such interpretations are simply *reducible* to nothing more than the expressions of our desires. The crucial point is that we can be mindful that what are presented as explanations, in fact, *describe*, and descriptions are shaped by interests. Aware of these influences, we might better critically engage our efforts to make sense of the world around us and our place and possibilities within it.

Notes

- 1 The passage in the German original: 'Eine neue Gattung von Philosophen kommt herauf: ich wage es, sie auf einen nicht ungefährlichen Namen zu taufen. So wie ich sie errathe, so wie sie sich errathen lassen – denn es gehört zu ihrer Art, irgend worin Räthsel bleiben zu *wollen* – , möchten diese Philosophen der Zukunft ein Recht, vielleicht auch ein Unrecht darauf haben, als *Versucher* bezeichnet zu werden. Dieser Name selbst ist zuletzt nur ein Versuch, und, wenn man will, eine *Versuchung*.'
- 2 The phrase 'hermeneutics of suspicion' stems from Ricoeur's positive use of the term to describe what he calls a 'school' of such thought in Marx, Nietzsche, and Freud. Later, the notion has taken on connotations of pernicious forms of scepticism (Ricoeur 1970: 32).
- 3 This diagnosis of critique is found in Latour 2004: 231. My account of how this might possibly play out in the reception of Nietzsche's philosophy is deliberately superficial and not intended as an indictment of any particular work of scholarship. The purpose of recounting it here is to identify some inherent risks, interpretative tendencies, which I think can still snare even seasoned scholars both in terms of what they *find* in Nietzsche or what they *see* in the scholarship.
- 4 Of course there are other ways of reading Nietzsche that do not follow this path, and there are certainly differences among what one might call *varieties of naturalism*, but the past 20 or so years of

- Anglo-American Nietzsche scholarship could be characterized by a tendency to emphasize this dimension of Nietzsche's thought. When naturalism is simply the refusal of or resistance to *supernaturalism*, this seems perfectly apt, though perhaps not terribly informative. To some extent, the tendency to *naturalize* can be found in philosophy more generally, see Rouse 2007: 61–86.
- 5 I discuss these views in Acampora 2006 and in Acampora and Ansell-Pearson 2011.
 - 6 See, for example, Hussain 2004 and Clark and Dudrick 2004.
 - 7 For more on Nietzsche's problem-posing practice, see Schacht 1995: ch. 4.
 - 8 This interpretation stands in contrast with Clark and Dudrick 2006. On Clark and Dudrick's account, Nietzsche's BGE is organized around a conflict between the will to truth and the will to value. A naturalism allied with will to truth fails to 'give access' to '“psychological, aesthetic, [and] ethical” facts' (157). On this basis, they argue for two varieties of naturalism, one that Nietzsche rejects and another that he embraces as consonant with the tension between the will to truth and the will to value. Borrowing a distinction drawn by Wilfrid Sellars, one is proper to 'a physical order' of a *space of causes*, the other to a 'normative order' of a *space of reasons*. On this basis, they interpret Nietzsche as advocating adherence to empirical evidence whenever possible (and as *always* preferable), but they endeavour to make room for a separate and distinct normative space: 'If an empirical explanation of a phenomenon is possible, that explanation is to be preferred to an explanation of another kind (e.g. one that claims a basis in rational intuition)' (163). And: 'Nietzsche's naturalism is methodological, in the sense that he thinks that whenever a scientific explanation is available, one should accept that explanation. And this naturalism has ontological consequences: it refuses to posit entities invoked by explanations that compete with empirical explanations' (163). This is supposed to be the case because: 'The only things that stand outside the range of scientific explanation, on our account of Nietzsche's naturalism, are the thoughts and behavior of human beings' (164). They posit 'Nietzsche's naturalism as claiming that the best explanation for everything that is not rational or sense-making activity is the kind of causal or mechanistic explanation that natural science provides. [. . .] Nietzsche's view doesn't have us postulating any extra *things* (e.g. immaterial, immortal souls); rather, it says that fully natural beings have developed in such a way as to admit of true descriptions that cannot be had from an empirical perspective' (165). I disagree with their characterization of Nietzsche's endorsement of the empirical in these terms, and I also find the division of causes and reasons to obscure the ways Nietzsche thinks the natural and the normative are entwined.
 - 9 Some regard mental modelling as a precursor to or a dimension of engaging in thought experimentation. In the Nietzsche scholarship, I am unaware of discussions of mental modeling, *per se*, but others have explored the role of thought experiments in his work, particularly with respect to his notions of will to power and the eternal recurrence. Most recently, Bamford discusses Nietzsche's *experimentalism*, particularly *vis-à-vis* the form of thought experiments, and she surveys other discussions in the literature of Nietzsche's conception of *Versuch*. See Bamford 2016a, 2016b. In 'The Ethos of Inquiry' (2016a), her primary concern is with 'moral-experimental work' (17), experiments with living, with adopting differing affects and acquiring different experiences in order to test and temper moral beliefs. She draws on Dewey's distinction between scientific and empirical thinking, and defends the view that Nietzsche regards experimentalism as itself virtuous (*ibid.* 18–21).
 - 10 Most recently in Acampora 2013b: ch. 3.
 - 11 Cf. Norton 2004.
 - 12 Nersessian claims that 'the mundane ability to imagine and visualize underlies some of the most sophisticated forms of human reasoning' and is important to 'creative reasoning in science' (Nersessian 2007: 136).
 - 13 There is disagreement in the literature about whether non-propositional forms of reasoning are reducible to propositional form and content. For the view that they are, see Norton 2004. For recent discussion of the debate, which appears to tip toward recognition of distinctive (non-reducible) contributions to reasoning by mental model and thought experimentation, see Alexander 2016.
 - 14 See Nersessian 1993, especially p. 292.
 - 15 See, especially, Gendler 2007.
 - 16 This form of representation is discussed in a now classic taxonomy of thought experiments in Brown 1986.
 - 17 See also Barsalou and Prinz 1997.
 - 18 Work in philosophy of language and linguistics elaborates this in much greater detail. See, for example, Lakoff and Johnson 1998, and Johnson 1987.

- 19 As to what this passage portends for Nietzsche's naturalism, there is no clear agreement among Nietzsche scholars. Two recent accounts apparently diverge on the extent to which BGE 19 illustrates an application of Nietzsche's naturalism or demonstrates his assessment of its limitations, advancing a metaphysical agenda (Leiter 2009; Clark and Dudrick 2009).
- 20 I discuss this at greater length in Acampora 2013a.
- 21 Of course, this account of orders of rule and my example may make it sound as though Nietzsche is engaged in a project similar to that of the Platonic Socrates in the *Republic*. There are multiple discussions of precisely that in the scholarly literature. A key difference, I think, is that for Nietzsche, there is no 'little human being' who can be doing the choosing, ordering and organizing. There is just the perspective of whatever happens to be on top, that is, doing the ruling, and *that* is what we call 'I'. I am not treating these details in this chapter because I am simply highlighting the *fact* of Nietzsche's mental modelling and what it enables him to do. Whether his version of soul as a political entity is superior to Plato's, or whether he avoided some of the philosophical problems Plato encountered has been discussed in other literature.
- 22 Leiter suggests that BGE 19 demonstrates that Nietzsche abandons the idea of freedom of the will in favour of a fatalist conception of human existence and human psychology. Clark and Dudrick claim that 'BGE 19 aims to rehabilitate *the traditional notion of the will* in the face of the tendency of naturalism to simply dismiss it' (Clark and Dudrick 2009: 248, emphasis mine). But I think BGE 19 shows how a form of naturalism that is mindful of the role that invention, in the sense of the term above, might better support the aims of science *and* reinvigorate philosophical thinking. This does not carve out a separate niche for philosophy and distinguish naturalism from normative concerns, as Clark and Dudrick among others suggest. Clark and Dudrick write, 'Although Nietzsche is a naturalist in an important sense, and certainly rejects all forms of supernaturalism, there is an important sense in which he is not a naturalist, for he holds that human thought and action can be understood only from a perspective constituted by norms that have no role to play in our understanding of the natural world' (2009: 248). However, I maintain that Nietzsche does not believe that science or any other area of inquiry offers a value-free perspective, and thus there cannot be a *pure* naturalism as they and others seem to suggest.
- 23 For an interesting contemporary discussion of philosophical naturalism, see Rouse 2007. Numerous other Nietzsche scholars have also attempted to distinguish different ways of being a naturalist and the kinds of commitments entailed.
- 24 If one wanted another example of Nietzsche's rumination on renovating conceptual architecture and the differences it makes, one might read *On the Genealogy of Morals* as an effort to critically examine the effects of the ascetic ideal and the forms of life it shapes in light of the positive goal of anticipating what might be the next step of its development, namely whether it is possible to have a *life-affirming* ascetic ideal or whether a counter-ideal is possible.

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