


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# A Companion to Nietzsche

*Edited by*  
Keith Ansell Pearson

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## Naturalism and Nietzsche's Moral Psychology

CHRISTA DAVIS ACAMPORA

In *Beyond Good and Evil* Nietzsche anticipates a future philosophy that will break free of the moral prejudices he thinks cloud not only philosophy's metaphysical pursuits but also the inquiries of science. He announces that "psychology is now again the path to the fundamental problems" and that "psychology shall be recognized again as the queen of the sciences, for whose service and preparation the other sciences exist" (BGE 23). If we take "psychology" here to be philosophy of the mind, many contemporary philosophers would agree (even if they would think that Nietzsche has little to contribute to this area). And there is more on which Nietzsche and these like-minded philosophers would agree – this redirection of philosophy to psychology entails a naturalism that requires drawing on the best science available. But Nietzsche and our contemporary philosophers of mind would surely disagree on the sense in which philosophy might usefully be practiced as psychology, and their conceptions of what constitutes naturalization would surely diverge. It is a fairly recent development in secondary literature in the English language to focus on Nietzsche's naturalism as the dominant framework for his thinking generally and his moral views in particular.<sup>1</sup> I shall engage the most prominent literature on that front, suggest an agenda for future research along such lines, and highlight at least one path I see as indicated for developing Nietzsche's moral thinking informed by the psychology that issues from his naturalism and conception of philosophy.

One of the most basic elements of moral philosophy is the conception of the subject upon whom duties rest, to whom rights are granted, within whom virtues are cultivated or potencies are realized. If Nietzsche has a moral theory, and I shall not argue that he does, he must also have a conception of the subject that accounts for its moral agency, its possibilities for action, its potential goods, and its freedom. It is this subject that is my concern in this essay. Since I grant that Nietzsche's conception of the subject largely follows from his naturalism, I shall begin there, summarizing the most prominent contours and the problems it raises. The current trend of highlighting Nietzsche's naturalism presents a number of unresolved interpretative challenges, which I articulate and then indicate some possible ways of resolving. I argue that accounts that associate Nietzsche's naturalism with a strict form of scientism are mistaken and that those that grant a significant role to art in Nietzsche's account are superior to their alternative but nevertheless remain incomplete insofar as they leave relatively

empty the concept of artful appropriation that I agree is attributable to Nietzsche. The more specific aim of my essay, then, is to side with interpreters who emphasize the interplay of Nietzsche's naturalism and aestheticism – although I shall suggest Nietzsche anticipates that a time might come when they would not be entirely distinct – and then fill the gap in the literature by providing an example of one way in which artful appropriation might be engaged and its relevance for an ethos of the subject naturalized beyond the poles of good and evil in moral philosophy.

## 1 Nietzsche's (Artful) Naturalism

What does one mean when one calls Nietzsche a naturalist? In the straightforward sense of granting existence only to things natural and denying the existence of supernatural entities, Nietzsche, who famously proclaims the death of God and seeks to shine a light on his shadow, seems clearly a naturalist. And Nietzsche's broad philosophical projects, and perhaps his more significant contributions, are organized around his effort to "de-deify" nature (GS 109), which includes wringing residual supernatural notions from concepts – especially those relating to matters of truth, knowledge, and goodness – such that traces of the metaphysics he critiques are purged from inquiries that purportedly leave it behind. This is, for example, what leads Nietzsche to hostilely oppose teleological models of organic development and evolutionary theories that utilize teleological concepts, which imply there is some fundamental rational order directing development or some ultimately good end toward which all things progressively strive.

There is a more narrow conception of naturalism that focuses on the relation between philosophy and science such that it claims that philosophy is done best when it models its methods on the empirical sciences or that it ought to draw upon the researches of the empirical sciences, or both. Contemporary philosophy of mind provides a good example of an area that conceives naturalization in this last sense, as both informed by and modeled on sciences of the brain and cognition. It generally considers epistemological issues to revolve (or dissolve) around the researches of these two areas. Those who identify Nietzsche with naturalism must clarify precisely which of these views they are claiming Nietzsche holds.

It is this narrower conception of naturalism that is becoming increasingly popular among Nietzsche interpreters as his interest in and appropriation of his contemporary science becomes better known.<sup>2</sup> The narrower conception of naturalism as applied to Nietzsche commits him to having a (nearly unqualified) positive estimation of science and to model his own philosophical thinking on scientific methods, especially in its goal of identifying *explanatory causes*. Brian Leiter's *Nietzsche on Morality* advances arguments along these lines (Leiter 2002). He begins his book by asserting a dilemma between naturalism and postmodernism. For Leiter this reduces to a distinction between science and literature. A major goal of his book is to offer an account of how Nietzsche follows the first path, and thus why the secondary literature that pursues the second path is hopelessly flawed and lacks merit.<sup>3</sup> In his account of what constitutes naturalism in philosophy generally, Leiter describes naturalists who think philosophy should take its guide from the *methods* of science (whom Leiter labels

"M-Naturalists"), even when it is not obedient to specific scientific methods but still emulates them. Naturalists who emulate the methods of science are called "speculative naturalists" by Leiter, and he includes Hume in this group. He further distinguishes naturalists in terms of holding the following crucial view: "The speculative theories of M-Naturalists are 'modeled' on the sciences most importantly in that they take over from science the idea that natural phenomena have deterministic causes" (Leiter 2002: 5). Nietzsche is also an "S-naturalist" (substantive naturalist) in Leiter's view, insofar as he rejects supernatural agents or causes.

A concern with and an embrace of a particular conception of causation are crucial to Leiter's overall argument and the arguments of those who follow him in asserting that Nietzsche is a naturalist of this sort. Nietzsche's moral psychology, for Leiter, is essentially bound up with a "doctrine of types," according to which "Each person has a fixed psycho-physical constitution, which defines him as a particular type of person" (Leiter 2002: 8). The type of person one is, the type of fixed constitution one has, *causally determines* what one chooses and how one acts. Nietzsche's aim, Leiter asserts, is "to specify 'type-facts'" that serve as *explanations* for developments in the history of moralization – for example, the taking root of the ascetic ideal – and as *explanations* for why people take the actions they do and even why they hold certain ideas. Nietzsche's interest in causation, on Leiter's account, is not limited to this claim about type-facts as causes for human action and the development of moral theories based thereupon. He attributes to Nietzsche epistemological views about the relation between ascertainable "facts" and their status as truths.<sup>4</sup>

Leiter recognizes that his claims about truth and Nietzsche's faith in causation are at odds with other interpretations of Nietzsche that emphasize his apparent critiques of truth and science, which Leiter claims, "involve significant misreadings of Nietzsche" (Leiter 2002: 12). His insistence that Nietzsche maintained a positive interest in truth is more defensible than his view that Nietzsche was skeptical about causation only prior to his overcoming of Kant's (and the neo-Kantians') noumenal/phenomenal distinction (Leiter 2002: 22–3). I shall focus the remainder of my discussion of ways of naturalizing Nietzsche on just this one point (although there are numerous other paths one could pursue) because, as I shall show, it illuminates precisely why a different understanding of Nietzsche's naturalism is warranted and fruitful. For I shall further argue that the failure to appreciate Nietzsche's critical remarks on causation is intimately connected to the failure to appreciate the genuine *depths* of Nietzsche's interest in truth (rather than his rejection of truth). What I shall term Nietzsche's "artful naturalism" addresses this very concern and, once applied, indicates a prominent feature of Nietzsche's moral psychology, namely a different possibility for understanding the prospective moral agent and its possibilities for the activity of creative valuing.

The conclusion at which I am aiming can now be summarized thus: Nietzsche is clearly a naturalist in seeking a focus on natural, observable phenomena for garnering our understanding of the world and our place within it. Empirical science is admirable for Nietzsche because of its rigorous method and its concern to free itself of supernatural and mythological presuppositions. The latter motivation reflects a kind of mental hygiene that for a long time has been recognized as important in philosophy but is rarely achieved, namely to avoid the use of hidden or unjustified assumptions. The problem with science, for Nietzsche, is that it quite often sneaks in principles or articles

of faith that smack of the very metaphysical and theological conceptions that it seeks to overcome. Two such ideas that were crucial to the science of his day, and one of which remains the bedrock of scientific inquiry, are the teleological conception of nature and the concept of causation. If we shed these ideas, if development cannot be understood in terms of having discernible purposes or a fundamental goal, and if the common conception of causality is problematic,<sup>5</sup> then much of scientific inquiry is in jeopardy. Without a different conception of naturalism, it seems we reach an impasse and must either retreat to literature or become complete skeptics. But Nietzsche sees another alternative, namely the possibility of naturalizing “cheerfully” to use Richard Schacht’s familiar phrase in his treatment of Nietzsche’s *Gay Science* (Schacht 1988). I shall call the alternative artful naturalism, which conceives the fruit of philosophical psychology as an understanding of what I shall term *artful appropriation*. This reading of Nietzsche’s naturalism emphasizes the centrality of art in his critique and appropriation of science. Adherents of this position are also increasing in number; among them Christoph Cox goes to the greatest lengths in elaborating the relation between Nietzsche’s naturalism and his aesthetics, broadly conceived so as to include his interests in interpretation and valuation (Cox 1999).

Unlike Leiter, Cox takes Nietzsche’s aestheticism seriously insofar as he grants it a place of primacy in Nietzsche’s philosophical project. He similarly defines Nietzsche’s naturalism in terms of scientism, claiming that Nietzsche “only criticizes science for its residual theology, its claim to describe pure and unmediated ‘facts’ about the world” (Cox 1999: 69–70 n. 1). It strikes me, though, that what is intended as a clarification at this point in Cox’s statement is, in fact, an *amplification*, one that makes an important difference. Nietzsche is critical of *both* the remnants of theological concepts upon which science relies *and* its pretense to purity or what it calls objectivity (which might very well be one of the ways in which it retains theological ideals in the sense that it claims for itself a “god-like view” on the world, although purity and immediacy need not be limited to theological contexts). Cox’s “only” is somewhat misleading, for Nietzsche at times appears to think that the entire scientific project to disclose the “joints of reality” stems from a theological or mythological impulse, that science still rests upon a “metaphysical faith” in the possibility and value of its ends (e.g., GS 344; cf. BGE 21, GS 112, and GS 121). The scientific perspective is preferable to Nietzsche in many respects, particularly for its *method* of inquiry, but there is also much he finds to criticize. Additionally, Nietzsche thinks science can be *improved* by the integration of certain aesthetic values and interests, not because this would make science more like art, but on account of the fact that he sees a significant role that valuation plays in the formation and pursuit of interests and how evaluative processes can be directed, organized, and reformed. Thus, when Nietzsche emphasizes the significance of art, he is not being *less* of a naturalist, as he sees it, but rather *more* of one. It is this key idea that requires a more thorough accounting in Nietzsche interpretation, and it bears tremendously on the enduring value of Nietzsche’s philosophy.

As Cox also grants, the point of the criticisms Nietzsche makes of science is to actually *strengthen* science, to make it better at informing us about the nature of the world and how we might better understand ourselves. The route to this *even more rigorous* science – what Nietzsche anticipates at GS 113 as a “higher organic system” – is not simply “more” science but rather its amalgamation with the aesthetic. Such a merger,



ultimately, does not rest upon a hierarchy of art over science, as seems to be the case in Nietzsche's *Birth of Tragedy*, but rather requires a kind of *reciprocal formation* insofar as the aesthetic is intrinsically involved in the process of interpretation that gives scientific researches their organization and direction. The scientific view is, for Nietzsche, an interpretation – one that is better than most, but an interpretation nonetheless, an “exegesis of the world” in the case of physics (*BGE* 14), a means of determining “our human relation to things” in the case of mathematics (*GS* 246). And, as Nietzsche's perspectivism holds, there is an irreducibility of interpretation. Science cannot somehow escape that fact.<sup>6</sup> A challenge faced by those who at least recognize this feature of Nietzsche's reflection on science and its relation to art is describing the nature of their entwinement, giving it some more substance and vivifying it. That is what I aim to do in the next few sections that describe Nietzsche's critique and revisioning of the supposed moral subject and its future possibilities.

Nietzsche's naturalism prevents him from casting the moral subject in terms of a soul or the creation of a supernatural being. The very same framework cautions him against reifying reason and encourages recognition of the fact that much of human existence is not the product of or under the control of reason. Thus conceptions of the moral subject in terms of a freely reasoning autonomous being are also doubtful. As I shall discuss at length below, drawing upon the sciences of his day, Nietzsche conceives human beings, strictly speaking, as constellations of forces. What we call the self, what we refer to when we talk about consciousness, is simply (although not simplistically or singly) the perspective or perspectives of dominant force(s).

So, if Nietzsche does not embrace the view that human beings are fundamentally free, does this mean that Nietzsche is a determinist? The question is ill formed. In setting aside metaphysical conceptions of the moral subject in terms of souls or rational autonomous beings, one also abandons the related metaphysical and moral concepts appropriate to such entities, including the polarity of free/determined. It is true that Nietzsche does not consider human beings to be free in the way that Kant supposed and Descartes asserted, but it is also the case that the other term in the dilemma falls away as its very basis is undermined. Nietzsche seems to think that the free/determined dilemma is a false one, and that neither concept is appropriate for the kind of beings humans are (cf. *BGE* 21). But how, then, does one make sense of human capabilities and potentialities in the absence of this framework? It is on this point that the characterization of Nietzsche's naturalism makes such a difference. Answers to this question appear on the horizon once one gets a better sense of how he conceives of human beings and how he might replace the conceptions of subjectivity he criticizes.

## 2 The Subject Naturalized

In what are generally described as Nietzsche's “mature writings,” namely those at least from *The Gay Science* onward, he links his critique of causality to his critique of the conception of the subject. Roughly put, Nietzsche speculates that our belief in causality significantly influences the conception of the subject – chiefly as willing, causal agent – and its responsibilities and potentialities. In *Beyond Good and Evil* he famously advises:

One should not wrongly reify "cause" and "effect," as the natural scientists do (and whoever, like them, now "naturalizes" in his thinking), according to the prevailing mechanical doltishness which makes the cause press and push until it "effects" its end; one should use "cause" and "effect" only as pure concepts, that is to say, as conventional fictions for the purpose of designation and communication – not for explanation. (BGE 21)

It is *description* – which is to say *interpretation* – that is accomplished in a causal account (GS 112). Cause and effect, Nietzsche suggests in the earlier work *The Gay Science*, are moments selected from a process of change; what we call "cause" and "effect" stem from an interpretation of this process from which we extrapolate a relationship between two entities that we determine as separate and discrete:

Cause and effect: such a duality probably never exists; in truth we are confronted by a continuum out of which we isolate a couple of pieces, just as we perceive motion only as isolated points and then infer it without ever actually seeing it. The suddenness with which many effects stand out misleads us; actually, it is sudden only for us. In this moment of suddenness there is an infinite number of processes that elude us. An intellect that could see cause and effect as a continuum and a flux and not, as we do, in terms of arbitrary division and dismemberment, would repudiate the concept of cause and effect and deny all conditionality. (GS 112)<sup>7</sup>

In calling the cause and effect relationship an interpretation, however, I do not suggest that we are simply free to come up with any other account that we might wish to counter the interpretation Nietzsche critiques. In the passage cited above, Nietzsche speculates that another intellect that had the capability to see things otherwise might very well reject the concept of causality; there would simply be no reason to hold it – another and different interpretation would better describe experience. Our interpretations are, Nietzsche appears to believe, significantly related to our possibilities for experience, and they are not bald fictions as critics of Nietzsche's perspectivism often protest.

Nietzsche's critical comments on morality, especially outside of but also within *On the Genealogy of Morals*, focus on a critique of fundamental concepts of morality such as the nature of the individual and the freedom of the will. And such critiques also make trouble for the (alternative) naturalist's account insofar as they call into question the legitimacy of related concepts such as those of substance and causation. Nietzsche's naturalistic undermining of morality simultaneously destabilizes key tenets of the scientific naturalistic view. Nowhere is this more apparent than in *Twilight of the Idols*, in the collection of paragraphs on "The Four Great Errors." It is worth quoting a portion at length to draw out the numerous ideas it entwines:

*The error of a false causality.* [ . . . ] We believed ourselves to be causal in the act of willing: we thought that here at least we caught causality in the act. [ . . . ] The conception of a consciousness ("spirit") as a cause, and later also that of the ego as cause (the "subject"), are only afterbirths: first the causality of the will was firmly accepted as given, as *empirical*. [ . . . ] And what a fine abuse we had perpetrated with this "empirical evidence"; we *created* the world on this basis as a world of causes, a world of will, a world of spirits. The most ancient and enduring psychology was at work here and did not do anything else: all

that happened was considered a doing, all doing the effect of a will; the world became to it a multiplicity of doers; a doer (a "subject") was slipped under all that happened. [...] The thing itself, to say it once more, the concept of-thing is a mere reflex of the faith in the ego as cause. And even your atom, my dear mechanists and physicists – how much error, how much rudimentary psychology is still residual in your atom! Not to mention the "thing-in-itself," the *horrendum pudendum* of the metaphysicians! The error of the spirit as cause mistaken for reality! And made the very measure of reality! And called God!

This reflects Nietzsche's curious account of the anthropocentrism that is deeply rooted in human psychology and which organizes our very scientific inquiries; it affects what constitutes "the empirical" as an organization of "things" in the first place. Here Nietzsche speculates that our self-conscious reflection gives us the impression of willing for which we postulate a cause. The "cause" of our willing has been variously conceived in terms of a soul, a spirit, or, more recently, an "ego," a "subject." Nietzsche's claim is that it was on the basis of this first (and fundamental, unjustified) assumption that we postulated causes behind all actions. Change is cast in terms of the "doing" of "things," which, conceptually, presupposes there is a *doer*. Thus, the empirical world of the scientist is populated by a host of "spirit"-subjects in the form of "doers" or agents. This is the framework in which the concept of causation operates. Although "materialists" or "physicists" would not describe the world and their work in this way, although they would not say that they think the world is inhabited by "spirit-doers," if we scrutinize how they think about causes, we find this conceptual substructure.<sup>8</sup>

If appeals to god(s), soul(s), and rational effective powers are deficient or defective forms of artful supernaturalism, then what are the alternatives? What is an appropriate way to conceive of ourselves, and does this leave any possibilities for a future morality? I shall address the latter question in the concluding section below. The answer to the former is that Nietzsche favors the scientific interpretation (presumably on the grounds that it is least fraught with, which is not to say that it is completely free from, the kinds of errors and ill-formed fundamental concepts mentioned above) that follows a line of thought advanced early on by Boscovich and which he considers to be more recently developed by the founder of evolutionary mechanics, Wilhelm Roux, namely the idea that human beings (indeed, that all that we identify as entities) are collections or organizations of forces (see Müller-Lauter 1999: 161–82).<sup>9</sup> What we call the individual, or "subject," is at best, for Nietzsche, a composite. In his published writings, this idea is explicitly stated in *Beyond Good and Evil* and reiterated in the *Genealogy*:

Boscovich has taught us to abjure the belief in the last part of the earth that "stood fast" – the belief in "substance," in "matter," in the earth-residuum and particle-atom [...] one must also, first of all, give the finishing stroke to that other and more calamitous atomism which Christianity has taught best and longest, the *soul atomism*. Let it be permitted to designate by this expression the belief which regards the soul as something indestructible, eternal, indivisible, as a monad, as an *atomon*: this belief ought to be expelled from science! (BGE 12)

the entire history of a "thing," an organ, a custom can in this way be a continuous sign-chain of ever new interpretations and adaptations whose causes do not even have to be related to one another but, on the contrary in some cases succeed and alternate with one another in a purely chance fashion. The "evolution" of a thing [...] is [...] a succession of more or less profound, more or less mutually independent processes of subduing, plus the resistances they encounter, the attempts at transformation for the purposes of defense and reaction. (GM II. 12)

In the second essay of the *Genealogy*, Nietzsche strives to replace the view of the individualized soul with the idea that "our organism is an oligarchy" (GM II. 1; cf. BGE 19). What we call consciousness is the formation resulting from the struggle between forces of (active) forgetting and remembering (GM II. 1-2; cf. GS 111). It is a building up of experiences that form as certain other aspects of our experience recede or are purged entirely.

In his notebooks, Nietzsche hypothesizes, on the basis of scientific studies of morphology, that a better description might cast the individual in terms of a complex struggle for power: "It is a question of a struggle between two elements of unequal power: a new arrangement of forces is achieved according to the measure of power of each of them. The second condition is something fundamentally different from the first (not its effect): the essential thing is that the factions in conflict emerge with different quanta of power" (KSA 13, 14[95]). There is, fundamentally, a dynamic struggle, with different elements discernible at any given moment and whose components are not stable. What we have is "the mutual struggle of that which becomes, often with the absorption of one's opponent; the number of developing elements not constant" (KSA 12, 7[54]). As this process goes, so goes our own appropriation, our own absorption of the world that we call "experience" and our interpretation thereof. Empirical observation is one of the ways in which we are part of the ongoing interpretative process (rather than causal system) that characterizes all of existence for Nietzsche, and, as some have admirably argued, "will to power" is simply the name that Nietzsche gives to this ongoing interpretative and appropriative process (see also Cox 1999: 239-41).

So the critique of causation exposes a prior error in a mistaken postulation of ourselves as subjects or effective agents. For Nietzsche, the idea that there is some "essential self" must disappear along with the appearance/reality distinction. *There are* thoughts and actions. Exercising intellectual conscience, we realize that we simply are not entitled to the postulation of a hidden or core reality that stands behind thoughts and actions as their cause or agent. And just as "the deed is everything" (GM I. 13), so there is no subject behind our actions or thoughts, at least not in the way that Descartes and others conceived of such an "I" (cf. BGE 16 and 17).

Thus Nietzsche's naturalism leads him to consider replacing belief in the existence of individuals with a conception of the human being as a complex of forces. And, with that, he dissolves the conceptions of the willful human agent and cause and effect, which are more akin to articles of faith than actual knowledge. Nietzsche's concern is that if we remain unquestioningly committed to these ideas and permit them to guide our scientific inquiries, we will retreat further into the subjective anthropomorphic world of the human rather than acquire the knowledge science seeks.

### 3 Nietzsche's *Artful* Naturalism

Just what is the *artful* aspect of artful appropriation that I have tied to Nietzsche's naturalism? And, in the context in which I have been discussing it, how does this artful activity stand in relation to what is considered the work of science? There are numerous helpful resources on Nietzsche's interest in art and aesthetics, including some that discuss its relation to science.<sup>10</sup> Art is a central interest for Nietzsche throughout his productive life, although his views about art and the contexts in which he considers it shift. Three particular aspects of this broad theme are most relevant to my discussion: (1) the contest between art and science that Nietzsche is keen on elaborating early in his career and which continue to hold his interest in his later writings; (2) his early characterization of artistic forces, which he designates as the Apollonian and Dionysian, and which he conceives not only as driving forces of art but also as evident in the creative and destructive work of nature as a whole; and (3) the connection between art and illusion (or semblance: *Schein*) and its relation to truth. I shall touch upon the first two points in the context of elaborating the third. Once it becomes clearer how Nietzsche thinks art and science stand in relation to each other and the project of truth, I shall revisit the conception of the subject that Nietzsche envisions and what might become of moral valuation in its light.

In describing what Nietzsche calls "the basic will of the spirit" (*Grundwillen des Geistes*) (BGE 230), Nietzsche attributes to human existence "needs and capacities [that are] the same as those which physiologists posit for everything that lives, grows, and multiplies." We can gain some additional insight into what Nietzsche might envision as "artful appropriation" as it relates to naturalism when we realize that Nietzsche associates what he describes as fundamental powers (*Kraften*) of *appropriation* and *artful creativity* with all things that "live, grow, and multiply." What we call "science" is a specialized and intensified exercise of these very powers that are basic to all living existence. Some extensive quotation of the relevant portions of the passage facilitate further appreciation of this point:

The spirit's power to appropriate the foreign stands revealed in its inclination to assimilate the new to the old, to simplify the manifold, and to overlook or repulse whatever is totally contradictory – just as it involuntarily emphasizes certain features and lines in what is foreign, in every piece of the "eternal world," retouching and falsifying the whole to suit itself. Its intent in all of this is to incorporate new "experiences," to file new things in old files – growth, in a word – or, more precisely, the *feeling* of growth, the feeling of increased power.

An apparently opposite drive serves this same will: a suddenly erupting decision in favor of ignorance, of deliberate exclusion, a shutting of one's windows, an internal No to this or that thing, a refusal to let things approach, a kind of state of defense against much that is knowable, a satisfaction with the dark, with the limiting horizon, a Yea and Amen to ignorance – all of which is necessary in proportion to a spirit's power to appropriate.

And these differing and at times opposing drives account for (and circumscribe) our will to deceive and to be deceived, which is countered by the desire or will to know:

This *Willen zum Schein* [will to semblance], to simplification, to masks, to cloaks, in short, to the surface – for every surface is a cloak – is *countered* by that sublime inclination of the seeker after knowledge who insists on profundity, multiplicity, and thoroughness, with a *will* which is a kind of cruelty of the intellectual conscience and taste.

What Nietzsche means by the *Willen zum Schein* and his frequent praise and even celebration of appearances elsewhere must be understood in this context. In embracing *semblance* (or, as it might otherwise but more problematically be translated, “appearances”<sup>11</sup>), Nietzsche neither rejects *truth* (and thus proclaims the superiority of its opposite), nor gives up on truth altogether (thus celebrating *merely* the play of the apparent). The will to deception, for Nietzsche, is also part of the process of ratiocination insofar as conceptualizing entails overlooking differences and inventing similarities.<sup>12</sup>

These counteracting wills – to deceive and to know, to cover and *discover* – should strike readers familiar with Nietzsche’s thought as similar to his account of the opposing artistic forces of the Apollonian and Dionysian in *The Birth of Tragedy*. There, Nietzsche associates the Apollonian with a plastic force that generates illusion and the Dionysian with a form-rending force that aims to dissolve the illusory images the Apollonian creates. Their contest and play of the production and reformation of illusion (or semblance: *Schein*) is what accounts for the tension that generated tragedy. But, in Nietzsche’s story, this tension was disrupted with the appearance of Socratism, which, among other things, gave *Schein* a bad name, indeed, an association with moral failing, and it intensified the desire or will to know over and above the will to deceive (and be deceived in the play of the artistic images of the artist).

An excellent discussion of *Schein* in Nietzsche’s philosophy, including a brief but very helpful discussion of its relation to discussions of *Schein* in Kant and Schopenhauer, is advanced by Robert Rethy (1991). Rethy convincingly argues that early on Nietzsche, influenced by Schopenhauer, comes to see *Schein* and *Erscheinung* (the latter, for Kant, the appearance that stands in opposition to the “thing-in-itself”) as on a continuum rather than in a binary relation of true or false. Whereas Kant associates *Schein* with error (i.e., the mistaken belief that the apparent *is* the real) and with deception to be avoided, Nietzsche attributes a kind of innocence to *Schein* as apparent semblance and play of appearances that can be captivating and willfully pursued in a manner similar to art. In *The Birth of Tragedy* (and later), *Schein* is associated with a kind of “honest deceptiveness,” itself a kind of truthfulness. What Nietzsche means by this is that, rather than *mere* illusion or delusion, the deceptiveness of *Schein* discloses something about the proclivity of the world itself (whatever *that* may be) to dissimulate, to bear semblance, to highlight its aspects of unreality (see *BT* 1; Rethy 1991: 61–5).

What is meant by “innocence” here, and what sense could we make of thinking of scientific enterprises, or the pursuit of naturalism, as having truck with *semblance* rather than *truth*? It is at this point that we would do well to take notice of the broader context of Nietzsche’s concern. It would be a mistake to think that Nietzsche celebrates semblance *rather than*, or *in opposition to*, truth, in which case one maintains the opposition between *mere appearance* or *illusion* and some (presumably ontologically superior and epistemologically more faithful) *reality* whose understanding constitutes truth. Nietzsche does not simply reduce everything to illusion. Instead, he conceives *Schein* as

a kind of self-limitation. It is a reformulation of what constitutes truth, a redefinition of its boundaries and possibilities, rather than an opposition to truth.<sup>13</sup>

In this sense, *Schein* is not *mere* but uncannily *more* – semblance is not the mere appearance of some greater reality but rather something that conveys more than itself. What is this *more*? Nietzsche seems to think of it as a kind of extra or surplus. What is gained for truth (or, for our purposes, for science) in a willful embrace of *Schein*? This pointing beyond that appears to be involved in self-limitation involves recognition of the inventiveness in human rationalization, what Nietzsche associates with mathematics' determination of our human relation to nature (GS 246). It calls attention to the artfulness of human cognizing or the fundamental concepts of human thinking (such as causality, as discussed above) that help us to sort through and communicate our experiences. For the Nietzsche of *The Birth of Tragedy*, the artist (and for the later Nietzsche, the future philosopher practicing gay science) calls attention to the *Schein* of the transfiguration that constitutes the making of art, and in so doing thematizes or highlights the *Schein* of experience. This constitutes an intensification of the world-making enterprise in which we all participate. Experience for Nietzsche is *Schein*-making, but this does not stand in opposition to some essence whose appearance is transformed (and presumably thereby *deformed* by us). And *Schein*-making is inclusive of (although not exhausted by) the activities of selection, identification, coordination, and classification that are involved in the scientific enterprise. It also includes the embrace of willful ignorance and fascination with ambiguity that seems opposed to science and is more akin to indulgence in the fancy of fiction. The interplay of these two opposing drives, the will to appearance and the will to know, as Nietzsche describes it in BGE 230, involves a kind of cruelty (insofar as neither is given satisfaction as its opposite is indulged and pursued). But it is precisely this that Nietzsche appears to associate with a reformulated kind of "extravagant honesty" (*ausschweifende Redlichkeit*) if one wishes to continue to use moral terms, a reformulation of what others call "honesty [*Redlichkeit*], love of truth, love of wisdom, sacrifice for knowledge, heroism of the truthful."<sup>14</sup>

Nietzsche thinks that it is the very "harden[ing] in the discipline of science" that will lead us to recognition of these ideas about *Schein* and the appropriative capacities of human beings, and that this is the business of philosophy. Standing before the rest of nature, seeing himself as the appropriating being that he is because he is a part of nature, because that is the basic text of human existence, will lead, Nietzsche thinks, to this reformulated conception (purged of its moral content, its will to be "nice," and the seductive "siren songs of old metaphysical bird catchers") of honesty, truthfulness, and wisdom. Such a reformulation is what is involved in the translation of man back into nature described in BGE 230, one that will likely appear both "strange" and "insane" from the standpoint of metaphysics, perhaps even from the standpoint of philosophers driven to naturalism in the very narrow sense that I have been criticizing with Nietzsche.

This seems to be what Nietzsche envisions in GS 113 as "the higher organic system of knowledge," a system of knowledge that might further develop the multiple strengths that had to emerge in order for science to become a possibility for us. A curious thing about these different capacities, such as "the impulse to doubt, to negate, to wait, to collect, to dissolve," is that singly they could be quite detrimental, "poisons" that need to be kept "in check" by other capacities and integrated in "one organizing force within

one human being." A future time might come, Nietzsche suggests, when science and art, which seem opposed and detrimental to each other, might become similarly integrated: "And even now the time seems remote when artistic energies and the practical wisdom of life will join with scientific thinking to form a higher organic system in relation to which scholars, physicians, artists, and legislators – as we know them at present – would have to look like paltry relics of ancient times." Such a system might be possible to those who do not separate and distinguish the artful from the scientific when accounting for Nietzsche's naturalism.

So, if this conception of naturalism is more appropriate to Nietzsche, and if it is artful appropriation that leads him to call into question the conception of the subject that lies at the heart of moral theories, then what remains of moral values for Nietzsche? If the moral subject as it has hitherto been conceived has no place in a more rigorous scientific, naturalistic account, then must morality similarly be entirely an illusion? Is there no place for talking about the moral subject? Does this mean there is no place for the concept of the soul? I shall address these questions in reverse order, beginning with the question of the soul, suggesting an alternative conception of the subject, and then, by way of conclusion, indicating a future possibility for thinking about values and their relations to this kind of subject.

Concerning the soul, Nietzsche writes:

Between ourselves, it is not at all necessary to get rid of "the soul" at the same time, and thus to renounce one of the most ancient and venerable hypotheses – as happens frequently to clumsy naturalists who can hardly touch on "the soul" without immediately losing it. But the way is open for new versions and refinements of the soul-hypothesis; and such conceptions as "mortal soul," and "soul as subjective multiplicity," and "soul as social structure of the drives and affects," want henceforth to have citizens' rights in science. (BGE 12)

The refinement of "the soul hypothesis," the source for a new conception of the human subject, is one of the prospects and possibilities for artful naturalism. Its conceptual generation is anticipated as engaging an integrative mode of philosophizing in which one draws upon the researches of science, critically testing concepts for unwarranted assumptions along the lines sketched above, while creatively generating alternative concepts when such are found lacking (an activity Nietzsche conceives as artistry).

Nietzsche's reflection upon and ultimate rejection of at least certain kinds of evolutionary theories reflect his concern to reconceptualize the human subject. In the introductory sections of *On the Genealogy of Morals*, Nietzsche is critical of the "English psychologists" who draw upon what he takes to be Darwinian evolutionary theory in their accounts of the evolutionary development of morality out of utility and the advantage (for a group) of altruism.<sup>15</sup> Much like cause and effect are described as isolated moments out of a continuum of experience in GS 112, what we have hitherto called the human subject might be an isolated moment in a stream of experience that constitutes human existence. How might we conceive such an entity that is in a perpetual state of change, of becoming, and how would this stand in relation to the more familiar concept of the human subject as "evolved" or even "evolving"? Alan D. Schrift has outlined such a concept in terms of *compound becoming*, an idea he describes as further developed by Deleuze.<sup>16</sup>



The subject as “compound becoming” differs from the kind of subject entailed by evolutionary accounts. An evolutionary path of the subject is marked and measured by beginnings and endpoints, in which case the significance of the passage between is generally diminished or obscured. But compound becoming sets its sights precisely on the process of change, and in so doing the endpoints recede. Schrift describes this difference thus: “Becomings take place *between* poles, they are the in-betweens that pass only and always along a middle without origin or destination” (Schrift 2001: 56). Such a conception of the subject better captures the continuum Nietzsche hypothesizes above. Even a subject naturalized could result in very different models for conceiving human existence. Emphasis on an evolutionary model selects or picks out a different set of concerns and points of interest than a model of compound becoming, which also has a basis in a scientific account of the nature of human existence. So, the choice of conceptual frameworks briefly indicated here is not limited to literature or naturalism but rather suggests different paths that follow different kinds of naturalistic accounts.<sup>17</sup>

What motivates or accounts for the changes that constitute the “becomings” in this alternative model? Nietzsche’s answer appears to be that it is the conflict and struggle of the forces we are. Such forces are innumerable, and even if we were able to fix their number at any given point that number would change as some are absorbed and incorporated by others. Nietzsche variously endeavors to capture the sense of the process of the relation of forces by radically simplifying their number and casting their struggle on a grand scale – the struggle between the creative force of the Apollonian and the destructive force of the Dionysian (*BT*), the struggle between remembering and forgetting (*GM*), the struggle between the will to deception and the will to knowledge (*BGE*). Precisely how these forces relate to each other requires greater attention and elaboration than this essay allows, but one thing is clear: Nietzsche appears to think that these conflicts are defining – we *are* the interpretations of these battles<sup>18</sup> – and productive – the outcomes of these struggles account for different stages of development, which have no particular or final direction or end. Nietzsche’s agonistic subject is at war with himself – or, to be more precise, *is* a war himself – but unlike Nietzsche’s predecessors, who also grant that the human is subject to conflict and who have sought to eliminate this struggle as a way of gaining mastery over the self, Nietzsche often suggests it is the maintenance and sustenance of such discord that constitutes the best life as he sees it. What kind of morality could possibly be generated from this disharmony and dissonance? By way of conclusion, I shall suggest that Nietzsche conceives a possibility of deriving values out of conflict in such a way that it both cultivates the subject characterized in the manner described above, which is to say it provides some organization (without elimination) of conflicting forces, and supplies a mechanism for deriving values that can be flexible and responsive to the *becoming* constituents of the communities such values bind and define.

#### 4 Toward an Ethos of the Agonized Subject

The term “ethos” in the title of this section signals that I think Nietzsche still envisions possibilities for articulating a *way of life* after the overcoming of the subject of morality (that is, once the major terms of the conceptual framework that supports moral

thinking generally are undermined). Such an ethos would allow for the production of values (that is, it would not be nihilistic) and would indicate ways of relating to other beings (so it would provide some direction for action). This need not necessarily constitute an ethics that specifies in advance what the values should be or how they should be acted upon and embraced. What widespread competitive interaction might contribute to the development of such an ethos is supplying a mechanism for deriving values and playing a role in constituting subjects, which is to say providing a general framework for distinguishing and integrating subjects in the context of agonistic interaction. What is generally missing from discussions of Nietzsche's agonism is an account of how contest potentially serves this function for Nietzsche and how it might be relevant to other ethical frameworks.

In keeping with his interests in evolutionary models that are expansive rather than conservative, Nietzsche conceives of virtue as strength and not simply endurance. In *Twilight of the Idols*, he describes physiological vitality a cause of virtue, rather than having virtue follow the reverse order in which case it yields the reward of (at least spiritual) strength and good fortune. Nietzsche writes, "first example of my 'revaluation of all values': a well-turned-out human being, a 'happy one,' must perform certain actions and shrinks instinctively from other actions; he carries the order, which he represents physiologically, into his relations with other human beings and things. In a formula: his virtue is the effect of his happiness [*In Formel: seine Tugend ist die Folge seines Glücks . . .*]" (TI, "Errors," 2). Here, happiness is defined physiologically, in terms of a kind of health, keenness of instinct, and integration of the multiplicity of drives that together constitute what we call will: "Every mistake in every sense is the effect of the degeneration of instinct, of the disintegration of will; one could almost define what is bad in this way" (TI, "Errors," 2). And, although Nietzsche's characterization cannot rule out the possibility that a person we would consider to be ruthless and cruel could at the same time fit his description of a person who manifests such virtue, it is not limited to such types.

So, what integrates the will, sharpens the instincts, and facilitates directing the aims of human existence? Although such aims will not be specifiable in advance – as there can be no particular end, no particular potentiality, no particular way of life that is fundamentally good and in light of which we should live – it is possible to continuously redefine and reshape such aims in ways that avoid both nihilism and a pernicious relativism. The model for this draws on a conception of social life as organized in a way similar to how Nietzsche thinks "individualized" organic life is organized: agonistically, which involves giving shape and direction to the struggle that characterizes human existence, the constellation of forces described above. Nietzsche's agonistic model can be sketched briefly in order to provide some sense of how this addresses both the issue of how values might be shaped in an ethos of agonism and how such a model bears on what I have described as Nietzsche's artful naturalism.

Nietzsche conceives contestation as an organizing structure in both cultures and individuals. This idea emerges early in his career (for example, *The Birth of Tragedy* and "Homer's Contest") and gets refined throughout such that it appears even as late as *Twilight of the Idols* (for example, in the sections on "The Problem of Socrates" and "What I Owe the Ancients"). Competitive relations serve as an organizing force of culture by bringing together diverse elements, coordinating heterogeneous interests,

and providing occasions for the refinement and exercise of judgment. Insofar as competitors with similar but differing abilities vie for the estimation and recognition of superiority by the community of those who would bestow honor upon them, competition provides opportunities for self- and communal evaluation. And such evaluation can be endogenous, the standard emerging from within the relation of the competitors.<sup>19</sup>

The *agon* provided Nietzsche with a graphic image of how meaning could be publicly produced and reproduced. Agonistic contest, for Nietzsche, is a potentially productive force that regulates without subjugating the interests of individuals, coordinating them without reducing them to the interests of the community, and provides a radical openness for the circulation of power that avoids ossification into tyranny. (Nietzsche's interest in what he describes as the origin of ostracism in ancient Greece supports this last point. It originally served the function of expelling a hegemonic force that would shut down any possible competition and was not simply a means for one party or group to rid itself of a more powerful competitor. See "Homer's Contest".)

Moreover, Nietzsche sees contest as a way of mediating the tension between the individual and the group. Participants can distinguish themselves through pursuits in competitive interaction, thereby supplying basis for their claim to individuality. In this way agonized spaces gather the context out of which distinctive performances emerge. Understood in this light agonized spaces quite literally *activate* an ongoing process of individualization. In this way, the *agon* potentially *cultivates subjects*, supplying them with integrity and unity where no such traits might exist otherwise.

The *agon* also *cultivates values*. Competitive interaction supports the activity of value creation as it generates social significance through the relation between the individual and the community of judges who bear witness to and sanction the action produced in agonistic engagement. Nietzsche envisions the best possible situation as one in which these interests are reciprocal and in tension: the community desires the production of greatness cast in terms that it establishes; the most potent competitor achieves the affirmation of the community that provides the conditions for the possibility of her victory, but she also aspires to become the standard bearer, to bring about a reformation of judgment generally.

Finally, Nietzsche admires the radical openness of the circulation of power that well-regulated contests can provide when they widely extend the promise of competitive enterprise and place some kind of cap on competitive dominance that keeps the good of the contest in play. Because the competitive relation can lapse into complacent hubris or destructive and violent aggression, it is a fragile condition to maintain. Sustaining the way of life the *agon* fosters requires preserving the viability of challenge and maintaining sufficient flexibility in generating decisions about excellence that are both relative to past performances and in accordance with new standards that are derived through subjecting the prevailing standards of measure to contest.<sup>20</sup>

Agonistic interaction sharpens by testing the instincts, and it integrates will insofar as it yokes diverse interests under the possibilities presented by the agonistic situation. It is thus that Nietzsche can envision his agonized subjectivity as attaining the new kind of virtue he describes in his first attempt at a revaluation of all values. Such virtue and the prospective route for attaining it are conceived through the application of Nietzsche's artful naturalism, which draws upon a conception of the human

being informed by science, described above as the subject naturalized, but whose conceptualization and ultimate realization is creatively amplified, refined, and further vivified in the recreation and reorientation of aims that contestation affords.

See also 3 "The Aesthetic Justification of Existence"; 6 "Nietzsche's 'Gay' Science"; 9 "The Naturalisms of *Beyond Good and Evil*"; 18 "Naturalism and Genealogy"; 20 "Agent and Deed in Nietzsche's *Genealogy of Morals*"; 24 "Nietzsche *contra* Liberalism on Freedom"

## Notes

For numerous helpful comments and suggestions on this essay, I am very grateful to Keith Ansell Pearson.

- 1 "Nietzsche's naturalism" is deployed as the guiding idea behind the selection of materials for the recent edition of Nietzsche, *Writings from the Late Notebooks* (2003). In the introduction, the editor Rüdiger Bittner elaborates what he takes to be Nietzsche's project in light of his own reading of *Beyond Good and Evil*, where Nietzsche famously defines the task "to translate man back into nature" ("den Menschen nämlich zurückübersetzen in die Natur"; BGE 230). Bittner has a curious reading of this passage insofar as he considers "translating back" as something different from translation (and, presumably, something different from interpretation), a kind of uncovering or undoing of other translations that have falsified. I discuss the passage in question from *Beyond Good and Evil* below. It is worth mentioning at this point that Bittner does not treat the relevance of Nietzsche's conception of art to his naturalism. In fact, he intentionally ignores it precisely in the place that I argue it is most crucial – with regard to how Nietzsche conceives knowledge.
- 2 For some examples, see Moore 2002; Small 2001; Moore and Brobjer 2004.
- 3 See especially Leiter 2002: 1–29. The dilemma appears to be a false one considering that the very thinkers Leiter dismisses as "postmodern" (e.g., Derrida) themselves draw upon various contemporary scientific theories in the organization of their thought.
- 4 Leiter largely follows Clark's arguments for Nietzsche's interest in and estimation of truth. See Clark 1990.
- 5 The evidence for this view is offered below in the section on Nietzsche's conception of the individual. As I, joining others who would hardly fit the bill of "postmodern," shall illustrate, Nietzsche is nowhere more suspicious of causation than in the later writings that Leiter and others who are similarly minded deem Nietzsche's "mature" philosophy. Thus, those who hold that Nietzsche's critical remarks about causation are limited to his earlier writings are simply mistaken. I have described Nietzsche's concerns about teleology and his experiments with developing an alternative in Acampora 2004. See also Swift 1999.
- 6 Cox characterizes this position as Nietzsche "treading paths between relativism and dogmatism": "The apparent relativism of perspectivism is held in check by Nietzsche's naturalism, which offers the doctrines of will to power and becoming in place of all theological interpretations; the apparent dogmatism of will to power and becoming is mitigated by perspectivism, which grants that will to power and becoming are themselves interpretations, yet ones that are better by naturalistic standards" (Cox 1999: 106). On Nietzsche's naturalism and its bearing on the apparent contradiction between Nietzsche's conception of cultivation or breeding (*Züchtung*) and fate (in the imperative of *amor fati*), see Groff 2003. Groff's essay is an admirable response to the challenge Leiter poses to interpretations of Nietzsche that emphasize his interest in creativity and transformation in the sense of

self-overcoming (see Leiter 1998). This also bears on Leiter's emphasis in his *Nietzsche on Morality* on fatalism as he takes it to follow from Nietzsche's theory of types. But if, as I argue below, Leiter is mistaken about Nietzsche's views of causation, then the explanative power Leiter aims to garner from Nietzsche's so-called theory of types (as causally determining a person's thoughts and actions) is lost.

- 7 Cf. BGE 14. Nietzsche might very well have in mind Karl Ernst von Baer's study of perception relative to life span and sensory capacity, which Nietzsche cites in his earlier lectures on the pre-Platonic philosophers. It was Baer's hypothesis that the appearances of change, development, and growth are relative to perception. Creatures perceiving at lower rates of speed have the experience of persistence, but an increase in the speed of perception would result in the phenomenon of constant becoming. See Baer 1862. Greg Whitlock, in his notes to his translation of Nietzsche's lectures on the pre-Platonics, invites comparison of these ideas with *Daybreak* 117. See *The Pre-Platonic Philosophers*, p. 60 n. 35.
- 8 This is not to say that Nietzsche rejects causation altogether, only that our current way of conceiving it is hampered by these other conceptual presuppositions or "errors" as he calls them. The section from *Twilight of the Idols* addresses what Nietzsche designates as "false causes" and "imaginary causes." He claims that the danger of these is that we accept them over and above the *real* causes: "Thus originates a habitual acceptance of a particular causal interpretation, which, as a matter of fact, inhibits any investigation into the real cause – even precludes it" (TI, "Errors," 4). This suggests that Nietzsche endorses some kind of causation but calls into question its conceptual formulation, its place in a conceptual framework organized around various metaphysical abstractions such as subjects and doers. Nietzsche's artful naturalism would seek to craft an interpretation of causality that is at least free of this error.
- 9 Helpful elaboration of these ideas in their context of other scientific developments and conceptual schemes is found in Moore 2002: ch. 1, "The Physiology of Power."
- 10 The most extensive treatment in English of Nietzsche's conception of art is Young 1994. The most extensive discussion of Nietzsche's aesthetics as it relates to his conception of science is Babich 1994.
- 11 Kaufmann actually compounds the problem when he translates this as "*mere* appearance" (emphasis mine).
- 12 This point is obviously relevant to Nietzsche's discussion of "truth and lies in a non-moral sense" and the metaphorical nature of thought. See "On Truth and Lies in a Non-Moral Sense," pp. 79–97. These ideas have been most elaborately discussed in Kofman 1993: esp. pp. 23–58.
- 13 Just as Nietzsche calls into question the opposition of appearance and reality, so too he challenges the binary opposition of truth and falsity: "what forces us at all to suppose that there is an essential opposition of 'true' and 'false'? Is it not sufficient to assume degrees of apparentness and, as it were, lighter and darker shadows and shades of appearance – different 'values,' to use the language of painters?" (BGE 34).
- 14 As Rethy demonstrates in his discussion of the evolution of Nietzsche's thought about *Schein*, Nietzsche strives to put *Schein* in a new relation, not in opposition to the thing-in-itself, not in opposition to reality, but rather *as* reality and in opposition to a "truth world," in opposition to *Verstand*. Rethy cites a note written contemporaneous to the writing of *Beyond Good and Evil*: "I thus place '*Schein*' not in opposition to 'reality' but rather on the contrary accept semblance as the reality which resists transformation into an imaginative 'truth world'. A more determinate name for this reality would be 'the will to power'" (KSA 11, 40[52], [53], p. 654; Rethy's translation on p. 69). Rethy writes, "The new opposition is thus not between *Erscheinung* and *Ding an sich*, but between *Schein* and *Verstand* and the *Berstandsbestimmungen* or Laws of Thought. [...] [T]here is [also] the characterization of

- Schein* as 'the actual and sole reality of things' (*wirkliche und einzige Realität der Dinge*). This surface may be the 'reality' of the *res*, but such a playful self-display does not allow the philosopher's 'going to the depths'; there are no depths, no 'grounds'" (Rethy 1991: 69).
- 15 Herbert Spencer, mentioned by name, is Nietzsche's main target. See *GM*, preface and I. 1–5. Illuminating and astute accounts of Nietzsche's interest in evolutionary theory are found in Robin Small's introduction to the new translation of Paul Rée's *Basic Writings* (2003); and in Moore 2002: ch. 2. While Nietzsche earlier accepted the account of the utility of altruistic acts as functioning to preserve the group and then becoming incorporated as habits whose utilities were forgotten, he later rejects that view. I am convinced by Moore's account of the development of Nietzsche's ideas about evolution and the physiological issues at stake in his account of morality, in which he claims that Nietzsche does not so much change his mind about the value and significance of science generally between *Human All Too Human* (where he admires and appears to endorse the evolutionary ethics of his contemporaries, but most especially the work along those lines that had been published by Rée) and *On the Genealogy of Morals* (in which he begins by denouncing the English psychologists of morals) as he changes his views about what he understood as the Darwinian basis of evolutionary ethics. Moore traces Nietzsche's arguments against conservation specifically as they develop alongside his reading of the zoologist William Rolph. See Moore 2002: 46–55. Moore elsewhere (1998) catalogs correspondences between Nietzsche's notes and Rolph's works. Thus, Nietzsche changes his mind about evolutionary ethics not because he has second thoughts about the prospects for evolutionary science generally but rather because of his conception of life and its possibilities for development. Ultimately, Nietzsche was concerned about the hidden teleology and anthropomorphism in such accounts, although his own alternative might very well repeat the same errors against which he struggled.
- 16 Another admirable effort to articulate an alternative conception of the subject in light of Nietzsche's critiques of what he takes to be the traditional subject of philosophy is found in Hales and Welshon 2000: chs. 6 and 7. Hales and Welshon also tackle the concept of causality and logic in light of Nietzsche's perspectivism (see their chs. 4 and 2, respectively).
- 17 A particularly helpful discussion of different ways of naturalizing philosophy relevant to this point can be found in Hoy 1988.
- 18 See e.g. Z I, "On the Gift-Giving Virtue": "Thus the body goes through history, a becoming [*ein Werdender*] and a fighting [*ein Kämpfender*]. And the spirit – what is that to the body? The herald of its fights and victories, companion and echo" (my translation).
- 19 This feature of the *agon* should be compared with the vision of the higher organic system Nietzsche anticipates in *GS* 113 and the struggle between the will to deception and the will to knowledge elaborated in the context of *BGE* 230 discussed above.
- 20 I have discussed Nietzsche's conception of the *agon*, particularly in terms of its limits, possibilities, and applications, in several articles. The two most relevant to this discussion are Acampora (2002) and Acampora (2003).

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